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Introduction and Research Question  
 
Serious divisions and weaknesses regarding its policies and activities at 
international level had made the European Union states passive and paralysed 
when the conflicts in former Yugoslavia started one after another. That is, it is even 
hard to say that EU member states had a common position and view on the Bosnian 
war in 1992-95 since they looked paralysed and ineffective and did not develop 
any constructive and visible policy instruments towards the Bosnian crisis although 
new political developments at the Balkan region took place at their doorsteps. 
Thus, in the aftermath of international independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(hereinafter, only Bosnia or BiH) the EU left the country at mercy of fierce 
nationalist struggles and neighboring states‟ ambitions to divide the country 
(Hadžikadunic, 2005: 27). While many expected this conflict to be an opportunity 
for the EU to prove its diplomatic and political strength in conflicting regions the 
result was just an opposite. As Javier Solana claimed, “when the Yugoslav wars 
broke out in the 1990s we watched as our neighbourhood burned because we had 
no means of responding to the crisis” (2009). In fact, the Yugoslavian conflict 
clearly demonstrated global balance of power, that is, proving European lack of 
commitment and military instruments and displaying the US as a key mediation 
actor which made critical efforts to end the war in November 1995 when the 
warring sides signed the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). In the beginning of the 
Yugoslav wars, the Luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos, then head of the 
EC Presidency, declared that the organization would intervene in the Yugoslav 
crisis because it was “the hour of Europe, not the hour of the United States” 
(Gordon 1997/1998, 75). However, this did not happen and the Bosnian war was 
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the hour of the US. The passive stance of the EU showed rather clearly that the 
Europeans lacked cohesiveness, determination and the instruments to bring the 
crisis under control (Lehne, 2004: 11). Thus, peace to Bosnian lands was brought 
mainly by intensive mediation and diplomatic efforts by the US officials designing 
the DPA as a country's future legal framework.  
In other words, the war in BiH ended in December 1995 when the Dayton Peace 
Agreement was signed. Thus, BiH‟s current political system is the product of the 
DPA (Bieber, 2006: 40). The signed Agreement established the Constitution of 
BiH supposes division of the country into two Entities: the Bosniak/Croat 
Federation of BiH (controlled by the Bosniaks and Croats), and the Republika 
Srpska (governed by the Serbs). Both Entities have their own political and 
administrative structures. The Federation of BiH is divided into three levels: the 
Entity level, the Cantonal level, and the Municipal level. The RS does not have a 
cantonal level, it only has municipalities. Overall, the DPA kept Bosnia as 
independent and sovereign country with a joint multi ethnic government. The DPA 
has produced an institutional framework where the entities have powers which 
hinder effective decision-making processes and thus largely leads to rise in ethnic 
polarization (Lexau, 2004: 7). Also, one of the most important goals of the DPA, 
restoration of security and physical infrastructure, has been satisfactorily met. 
However, the broader objective of organizing a multi-ethnic, democratic, and 
economically self-sustaining country is still a long way to happen (Daalder and 
Froman, 1999: 107). That is, while the DPA brought the war to an end and laid the 
foundation for consolidating peace, many observers also believe that the agreement 
as a document reflects wartime circumstances cannot by itself ensure BiH‟s future 
as a functioning democratic state (Ashdown, 2005). 
In other words, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been facing almost two decades long 
political and administrative paralysis due to slow and insufficient progress on 
necessary constitutional reforms expected from domestic political elites. In fact, 
Bosnian political representatives are expected to implement necessary changes in 
the country's constitutional framework to make it more democratic, functional and 
inclusive, as an important part of its Europeanising reform process that the country 
has been passing through since the end of the war in 1995. What‟s more, successful 
Europeanization process in Bosnia can not continue without much expected 
constitutional reforms. In other words, all existing “incompatibilities between 
Bosnia and Herzegovina's constitutional framework and the ECHR need to be 
addressed in order to ensure improved elections in 2010 elections and full 
compliance with the SAA requirements” (EC, 2009: 15). Further, Lippman points 
out that the local leaders in Bosnia are aware that, if their bid for accession to the 
EU is to be taken seriously, they will have to reform the state constitution (2006). 
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However, since local ethnic politicians hold opposing views over the question of 
constitutional reform it has proved rather difficult to reach a compromise on the 
necessary changes in the country‟s constitutional framework. Similarly, unclear 
and vague position of the EU member states on necessary and sufficient 
modifications on the Bosnian constitution is further deepening political deadlock in 
BiH. As Govedarica claims: “It is true that the EU has had no clear stance towards 
Bosnia. For a long time the EU officials have believed that the mere process of 
European integration will solve the country‟s problems. However, when it was 
clear that it was not the case then the EU could not find adequate alternative 
instrument” (2010). Thus, here our main question is: 
To what extent has the EU been responsible for insufficient changes with regard to 
the constitutional framework in Bosnia and Herzegovina?  
 
Theoretical Perspective and The European Standards  
Both in terms of administrative and democratic governance the Bosnian 
constitution is in tremendous need of some sort of change and reform. Better to 
say, the country can not move forward on its road to the European union 
membership under current constitutional framework. Therefore, the Bosnian 
government has to implement European democratic and effective administration 
standards that are based both on the Copenhagen and Madrid criteria, respectively. 
In other words, both  Copenhagen and Madrid criteria set the standards and rules 
that define whether an applicant country is eligible to enter the EU. Laid down at 
the June 1993 European Council in Copenhagen, the Copenhagen criteria states 
that, among other things, candidate country has to achieve stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and 
protection of minorities. Also, the Madrid criteria agreed in 1995 require that the 
applicant country must adjust its administrative structures to successfully 
implement EU reforms. Thus, these are the criteria that a country must fulfil to 
become the full EU member. Furthermore, any European state that respects the EU 
values and democratic principles may apply to become the EU member. It is this 
understanding of democratic transition that constitutes the logic of the Copenhagen 
political criteria. Therefore, to ask an applicant country to meet the Copenhagen 
political criteria in order to start the full accession negotiations means the 
realization and implementation of democratization reforms in that country 
(Keyman and Duzgit, 2006: 3). For instance, the EU has vigorously stimulated and 
pushed the democratization reforms by pressing the CEE countries into carrying 
Examining Constitutional Changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina… 21 
 
out necessary human rights reforms and implementing open political system (e.g. 
Linz and Stepan, 1996; Kopecky and Mudde, 2000). 
That is, each country that aspires to become the EU member has to make some 
changes in its political, legal, and economic policies and thus shaping its future 
increasingly with common values, interests, and norms which are agreed in 
Brussels. Haas defined this process as a „process whereby political actors in several 
distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and 
political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand 
jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states‟ (Haas, 1958, 16). Thus, the 
process of integration of the aspirant country into Brussels political and economic 
structures is conditioned upon implementing necessary standards and measures that 
are set beforehand by the EU officials through both Copenhagen and Madrid 
criteria. Thus, as other candidate and potential candidate countries, Bosnia is also 
expected to carry out necessary set of reforms which are built in these two criteria. 
In fact, this process is better known as Europeanization process which has become 
significant part of the Bosnian political reality. That is, since the mid-nineties the 
domestic „shift‟ was inbuilt in the administrative oriented analysis of domestic 
patterns of adaptation to EU membership (Boerzel, 1999; Zeff and Pirro, 2001). As 
defined by Radaelli, Europeanization means a set of “processes of (a) construction 
(b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, 
policy paradigms, styles, „ways of doing things‟ and shared beliefs and norms 
which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and 
public policies” (Radaelli, 2003, 30). Finally, Vink and Graziano provided a broad 
definition of Europeanization as a process of “domestic adaptation to European 
regional integration” (Vink and Graziano, 2007: 7). Also, Europeanization signifies 
a means and an end; it represents method as well as substance; it defines a project 
and a vision (Anastasakis, 2005). Thus, it is the European Union as attraction force 
that should clearly stress what are the necessary reforms and standards that must be 
implemented by the Bosnian government if they want their EU aspirations stay 
alive. 
 
Weaknesses and Shortcoming of the Dayton Agreement  
So far, the Dayton Agreement proved to have serious democratic weaknesses and 
thus blocking political and economic progress of the country. In other words, in 
terms of both democratic inclusiveness and administrative effectiveness the 
Bosnian constitutional framework based on the DPA has proved rather deficient. In 
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fact, the citizens from minority groups such as the Roma, Turks, or Jews, are 
granted only a limited degree of self-administration (Soberg, 2008: 715). For 
instance, according to current Bosnian constitutional framework candidacy of 
“others” or members of the minority groups is blocked to the posts of State 
Presidency and the House of Peoples. These positions are designed to be filled up 
by the three largest ethnic groups, the so-called „constituent‟ peoples, i.e. Bosniaks, 
Serbs, and Croats. However, on December 2009 the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg over the famous Finci-Sejdic case decided that preventing the 
members of minority groups from country's political posts is a clear discriminating 
act. Thus, the entire constitution enshrines ethnic discrimination as a principle of 
law; because of this discrimination, the Dayton-created constitution could 
theoretically prevent BiH from joining either the Council of Europe or the EU 
(Lyon: 2000: 112). Furthermore, regarding an administrative framework built in 
the DPA the country has very cumbersome, economically unsustainable, and 
fragmented bureaucracy. For example, a total number of ministers all over the 
country including state and entity levels adds up to 155. Thus, such a bureaucracy 
produces unnecessary duplication and an obvious loss of money. Overall, the 
Bosnian political system is built on a complex, decentralized, multi-layered and 
mainly ethno-political power-sharing model (Muehlmann, 2009, 141). 
However, even it has become clear to all that the current constitution is seriously 
discriminating against minority groups in the country even two years from the 
court‟s ruling have passed the country's politicians have not yet removed 
discriminatory provisions from the constitution due to their radically different 
ethnic interests over the issue. That is why, some scholars view Bosnia as a kind of 
ethnic-nationalist country rather than genuine democratic country or consolidated 
democracy. As Asim Mujkic points out: “I call a community characterized by the 
political priority of the ethnic group(s) over the individual that is implemented 
through democratic self-legislation, and a community characterized by the political 
priority of the ethnic group‟s right to self-determination over the citizen‟s right to 
self-determination where the citizen‟s membership in a political community is 
determined by her or his membership in ethnic community, Ethnopolis. And I call 
the political narrative and practice intended to justify this ethnically-based social 
construct, ethnopolitics” (2007: 116). Thus, Bosnia is still a profoundly 
undemocratic country even though it is seriously entrenched on the European 
integration process. What‟s more, discriminatory constitution is blocking country's 
further moves towards the European Union membership. When we come to 
expected reforms regarding the administrative framework very little progress has 
been made in terms of making the state government stronger and more functional. 
That is, the European Union has sought for strong and united state government 
with whom to conduct more effective negotiations and establish better bilateral 
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relations. Despite rise in central state competences it is still weak and 
dysfunctional. Thus, Dayton Agreement has failed to resolve the basic political and 
social cleavages around which warring parties were in the three-year conflict thus 
only changing the means by which ethnic groups are still fighting for their separate 
statehood (Woodward, 1997: 29). As a result, current state administration is still 
unable even to successfully implement acquis communautaire. What is more, the 
International Crisis Group concluded that BiH still is not a competent state, let 
alone one that inspires or enjoys the loyalty of all its citizens (ICG, 2002: 15). 
 
'The Europe Union Divided' 
Turkes points out that “the EU is not committing itself enough to create necessary 
platform to integrate BiH into the EU structures. Given the fact that current EU 
vision from Thessalonica to today has been to keep BiH at arms length, the EU has 
followed a strategy of `neither total exclusion nor a rapid integration” (2010). Thus, 
in terms of the necessary constitutional changes so far the EU has not been quite 
clear and has not defined concrete standards that should be adopted by the Bosnian 
government which would make its constitution more democratic and more 
functional. Although the EU politicians have very often stated that Bosnia cannot 
realize its EU membership aspirations if it does not make some sort of 
modifications on its constitution most of them have not clearly stressed what are 
the constitutional changes required and expected from the Bosnian side. Therefore, 
Bassuener and Lyon claim that “Most of all, the EU needs to articulate clearly to 
both politicians and citizens what level of functionality BiH needs to have attained 
before becoming a viable candidate for membership in the EU, … The EU must 
put forth a set of guidelines on what sort of BiH it can accept into its ranks, with 
clarity on what elements are unacceptable” (2009: 13). As a result, since the 
Bosnian Europeanization process the EU has held unclear and vague position on 
necessary and sufficient changes on the Bosnian constitution. Furthermore, for 
such an ambiguous position of the EU politicians we can to some extent accuse 
flexibility and openness to political manipulation of both the Copenhagen and 
Madrid criteria. In other words, the Copenhagen and Madrid criteria can be 
comprehended in hundred of different ways by different actors. Thus, the political 
conditions have been ambiguously defined and therefore caused disorientation 
within targeted governments regarding the necessary steps to take that would have 
satisfied the EU officials (Mineshima, 2002). Thus, the EU has not utilised the 
potential and capacity that the Copenhagen and Madrid criteria can provide, thus 
playing only marginal and weak role in the Europeanisation process in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  
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It seems that the similar thing happened to the member states since they have very 
diverse views on sensitive political issues such as the shape of the future 
constitutional reforms in Bosnia. For instance, the former US Ambassador Charles 
English argued that “part of the problem is that the EU itself is divided about 
Bosnia. Among member states, only a handful, most notably the UK, appear to 
have a clear grasp of the dangers posed by Bosnia's current political dynamics" 
(Tanner, 2011). Better to say, the member states do not have common position and 
they do not “speak with single voice” with regards to necessary changes in the 
Bosnian constitution. Thus, the European Commission President Barroso pointed 
out that while constitutional reform was not a strict condition for signing the SAA, 
“there is [a] link between these two processes … The EC and EU have to be 
convinced that they have a partner in BiH, which will be capable to respect its 
promises and implement the Agreement that we negotiate now” (2006). Also, 
Welner Almhofer, Austrian Ambassador to BiH, claims that the EU had never set 
the successful implementation of constitutional reforms as a condition for BiH‟s 
EU membership (2006). Furthermore, Solana pointed out in his speech “I do not 
think it would be a good idea to open Dayton again at this moment. Of course, if 
there is an agreement between the three sides on some arrangements or solutions, I 
would not be against it . . . [but] I very much hope that as time goes by you will 
have the discipline and the energy to do this alone, without the need for pressure 
and impulse from the international community” (2004). Thus, the EU has 
demonstrated its weaknesses and that it does not have clear-cut answer towards the 
Bosnian deadlock and European politicians have often thought that mere process of 
European integration will help the country to solve its political and economic 
problems. In that regard, Demetropoulou  warns that without clear and visible EU 
commitment the outlook will remain poor for the Western Balkans in general; the 
vicious circle will remain, as well as the European border north of the Balkan 
region (2002: 104). 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations  
Without doubt a long-lasting status quo on the constitutional modifications in the 
post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina has been one of the most triggering political 
problems that the country has been facing over the previous two decades. Although 
Bosnian political leaders several times tried to reach an agreement on the 
constitution they have could not overcome their radical positions. In other words, 
as domestic politicians have different views and interests on how the future 
constitution should look like it has proved rather difficult and now almost 
impossible to reach a compromise on the necessary changes and modifications. 
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What is more, the European Union politicians expect the Bosnian political elites to 
agree on the constitutional changes that will satisfy all the three ethnic 
communities although they know that it is a very naïve to wait for consensus on 
such a sensitive political and legal question for even more developed democratic 
countries. Although it is the Copenhagen and Madrid criteria that should define and 
clearly set the measures and legal standards that have to be implemented into the 
domestic policies by the Bosnian politicians, the EU member states have not 
demonstrated a common and clear position on required constitutional changes in 
Bosnian and Herzegovina. Thus, it seems that the EU member states are as divided 
as the Bosnian political elites are over the design and structure of the Bosnian 
constitution. In addition, from the very beginning of the Bosnian Europeanisation 
process the EU leaders and its officials have believed that the mere process of a 
European integration will solve the country‟s political, economic, and legal 
problems. However, the EU leaders should not forget that Europeanisation process 
is 'a two-way street' process in which Brussels puts the pressure on obstructing 
political forces in the EU aspirant country. Most importantly, if the EU aspires to 
become powerful and influential actor in international politics then it firstly has to 
demonstrate its power and transforming capabilities in its closest backyard. 
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Without doubt a long-lasting status quo regarding the constitutional changes in the 
post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina has become one of the most triggering and 
challenging political questions the country has been grappling with for so long. 
Different political interests and views of the three biggest ethnic communities in 
Bosnia on the future country's constitutional framework have prevented them to 
reach a viable agreement. Thus, it has become naïve to expect that domestic 
political elites on their own will reach an agreement on the constitutional reforms. 
Nevertheless, the European Union has repeatedly been sending the messages and 
statements that constitutional changes must be agreed by Bosnian politicians alone. 
Also, while the EU politicians have often pointed out that Bosnia cannot realize its 
EU membership aspirations if it does not make some sort of modifications on its 
constitution, most of them have not clearly stressed what are the concrete 
constitutional changes which the Bosnian politicians have to implement. As a 
result, unclear and ambiguous position of the EU member states on necessary and 
sufficient changes on the Bosnian constitution has further deepened a political 
deadlock in Bosnia.  
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